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Abstract
A simple model for simulating tug of war game as varying the player number in a team is discussed
to identify the slow pace of fast change. This model shows that a large number of information
sources leads slow change for the system. Also, we introduce an opinion diffusion model including
the effect of a high degree of clustering. This model shows that the de facto standard and lock-in
effect, well-known phenomena in economics and business management, can be explained by the
network clusters.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Network models are an active research field in recent, and many stylized features, such
as a short average length between nodes, a high clustering coefficient and a power-law
distribution, have been detected in many real network systems in nature and society [1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. The dynamics in small-world and scale-free networks is one of the
recent issues to be addressed in the study of complex networks. A small-world network [1, 4]
is generated by rewiring the links, and the scale-free network introduced by Baraba´si et al.
[2, 6] shows a power-law connectivity distribution. Recently, Klemm et al. [7, 8] introduced
an algorithm for a highly clustered scale-free network model. In particular, these network
models are used to investigate the dynamics of interaction elements in physics, biology,
economics, business management, and many other areas.
Econophysics is one of the most active interdisciplinary fields [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20]. One of the topics most widely studied at present is complex network models because
real financial markets have many interacting agents with a huge amount of information.
In addition, microscopic models including the spin model describe well the properties of
financial markets [16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. The agents are represented by spins and the interaction
between agents by fields in the model. This microscopic model is also widely applied to social
systems. In fact, economic and social systems are not very different from the viewpoint of
complex networks [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. There are many interactions and
communications between agents in the network, and these are subject to opinion dynamics.
Thus, complex network theory is a powerful instrument in interdisciplinary areas such as
econophysics. Agent-based models and game theory are useful approaches for investigating
economic and social networks [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39]. Agent-based models were
first considered in the late 1940s. In this type of model, agents with certain properties are
assumed and then simulations are carried out to model real phenomena. In this context, we
investigate opinion diffusion in complex networks using agent-based model.
II. TUG OF WAR GAME
In this section, we introduce a simple game which motivates the study of the following
section. Tug of war game, a simple test of strength which was part of the Olympic Games
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from 1900 to 1920, is investigated using computer simulation. The game rule is very simple;
two teams align themselves at opposite ends of a rope and pull against each other. In our
simulation, the player number in a team is varied from 10 through 10000. Every player’s
original stamina, si(t = 0), is 1.0, and it decays by his or her particular stamina decay rate
γi determined randomly between 0.9 to 1.0. In other words, a player’s stamina is derived
as si(t + 1) = γisi(t). Team strength is simply defined as the sum of the stamina of all
the players in the team. When the strength of one team exceeds that of the other team by
10%, the winner is determinated and the game is over. If the strength of the two teams is
balanced for a long time, the players become exhausted and the game ends in a draw. Our
game is played within 1000 time steps.
Fig. 1 shows the result of our tug of war game. In this figure, circles show the number
of time steps required to determinate the winner. However, every game does not have the
winner because some games end in a draw from the long balance of the power. We consider
only the games having the winner to calculate the number of time steps (circles), and define
the rate of determination (squares in Fig. 1) as the fraction of the game having the winner
over the whole game. For instance, we tested 1000 games between two teams of 10 players,
and got the result that 994 games can determinate the winner. The rate of determination
for this case is 0.994. As the number of players increases, the determination of the winner
becomes more difficult. Even if there is a weak player in one team, the stamina of the other
players can make up for this weak point. These complements are abundant with a large
number of players in the team, and may lead to a greater number of drawn games. When
the game is played between two teams of 10 players each, the winner can be determinated
after three time steps in almost all games. However, in a game with two teams of 10000
players, most games finish before the winner is determinated because players are totally
exhausted from the long power struggle between the two teams. Even though the winner
may be determinated by chance, this requires more than 20 time steps. A large number of
players in a team means that we have more factors (agents in this game) to consider and
need more time to calculate including these factors.
This is an example of the slow pace of fast change [40]. Nowadays, the market occasionally
accepts innovations rather slowly compared to the superior technological advances of the
innovation. The market is currently huge and is more complex than ever before. The amount
of information has considerably increased and an agent has a large amount of information to
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FIG. 1: Result of the tug of war game. Squares show the rate of determination, and circles the
number of time steps required to determinate the winner.
consider. It is not hard to imagine that an agent spends much time thinking and analyzing
before making a decision. Therefore, a change in personal decision requires more time than
before. The large number of player number in tug of war game corresponds to the abundant
information. The determination of the winner is directly connected to the decision making.
A node of complex network has many neighbors including nearest, second-nearest, third-
nearest ones, and so on, and the average path length of complex network is short. In the
study of opinion dynamics, an agent usually interacts with its neighbors. Neighbors give
the information to the agent, and the opinion diffuses quickly due to the short path length.
Therefore, when we investigate the opinion diffusion on complex network, the whole network
usually has only one opinion in a few time steps.
However, real world consists of various opinion groups and the various opinions do not
easily converge into one. It is necessary to consider more features for studying opinion
dynamics. We focus on clusters of complex network. If all neighbors of a given agent have
the same information, the agent will gather only one type of information and will not change
his/her mind in the future. Finally, the agent and the neighbors will form a cluster on this
basis. If the network consists of several clusters, the whole network is prevented from having
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only a single opinion. The result of this section is a motivation of the following one, the
opinion diffusion model with clusters on complex network.
III. OPINION DIFFUSION AND MARKETING STRATEGY
In this section, we investigate additional model rahter different from that of the previous
section but related to each other. The N agents in a given network have particular orien-
tations σi(t) = ±1 at discrete time step t. Usually, this spin model is used to study the
financial market by physicists as the orientation corresponds to the opinion to sell (−1) or
buy (+1) [16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. However, the application of this spin model can be expanded
to social opinion models of binary states such as yes (+1) or no (−1). From now, we de-
scribe this model as a study of the financial market for the convenience of description. The
orientation of agent i depends on the opinion of his neighbors as follows:
σi(t+ 1) =


+1 with probability p,
−1 with probability 1− p,
(1)
where
p =
1
1 + e−2Ii(t)
. (2)
The local field, Ii(t), is the sum of the orientation of the neighbors and is defined in
previous studies [17, 18] as:
Ii(t) =
1
M
∑
j
σj(t), (3)
where j means the neighbors of agent i and M is the number of those neighbors. The log
return (or price change) of the model at time t is
x(t) =
1
N
∑
σi(t), (4)
and x(t + 1) is simply derived to tanh x(t). Under this assumption, x(t + 1) is derived as
follows:
x(t + 1) =
1
N
∑
σi(t+ 1) = 2p− 1 =
eI − e−I
eI + e−I
= tanh Ii(t) = tanh x(t), (5)
and x(t) goes to zero as the time flows. However, we redefine the local field as
Ii(t) =
∑
j
σj(t), (6)
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which makes x(t) converge to +1 or -1 because x(t + 1) = tanhMx(t), and use it because
we investigate famous phenomena, de facto standard and lock-in, and the convergence to
+1 or -1 is more suitable to explain them.
First, we apply this model with 1000 agents to the Watts–Strogatz small-world network
model (the WS model) [4]. However, all agents in the network have the same opinion
and the log return xi(t) rapidly approaches +1 or −1. The long-range interactions of the
network makes opinion diffusion very fast and saturation occurs after a few iterations. We
also investigate the Baraba´si–Albert scale-free network model (the BA model) [5, 6], but
the result is similar to that of the WS model.
Recently, an algorithm for the highly clustered scale-free network model (the structured
model), which has several high clusters, was introduced by Klemm et al. [7]. When we
apply our model to this network model, the result is different from those of the WS and BA
models. We find a struggle for power between optimists and pessimists due to the clusters
of the network (Fig. 2). Klemm et al. also analyzed the features of self-organizing networks
with scale-free and small-world behaviors as a crossover between the structured model and
the BA model, adjusting the parameter µ (the growing model) [8]. The structured model is
constructed for µ = 0, and the BA model for µ = 1. We show the result with the µ value of
10−3 as a representative of the growing model in Fig. 2.
The result is sensitive to the initial condition. However, the log return of the BA model
always approaches +1 or -1 in a few time steps because the majorities who have one opinion
are formed very rapidly. In the case of the structured model, the log return reaches a
certain value that is different from +1 and -1 because of the struggle between several clusters
consisting of opinion +1 or -1. It also approaches +1 or -1 at the end, but very slowly than
that of the BA model. In addition, sometimes a few agents or clusters change their opinion
to the opposite, which leads to jumps in the log return (Fig. 2).
The structured model is basically one-dimension network, which has similar properties
with one-dimension lattice. The number of neighbors who have interactions are small but
the localities strong in the lattice, and the ordered state of the whole system is not appeared.
Thus, the result of the structured model can be from the one-dimensional structure than
the high clusters. To investigate this more detail, we tested our model in the growing model
as varying µ value, and found similar results over the whole areas of the value except when
µ approaches 1. That is why the dot-line (µ = 0, the structured model) and dash-line
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FIG. 2: Log returns in (a) the Baraba´si–Albert scale-free network model (upper solid-line) and (b)
the structured scale-free network model (lower dot-line). The middle dash-line is log return of (c)
the growing scale-free network model when the µ is 10−3.
(µ = 10−3, the growing model) show similar features, approaching not to +1 or -1 and some
jumps. If a crossover is observed when µ approaches almost 1, it is from the clustered feature
of the network than the one-dimensional structure [41].
The de facto standard is a well-known phenomenon in economics and business manage-
ment [12]. De facto is Latin for ‘in fact’ or ‘in practice’. A de facto standard is one that
everyone seems to follow as an authorized standard, such as Microsoft Windows, Apple iPod,
and VHS, a recording and playing standard for video cassette recorders. Lock-in, a situation
whereby a customer depends on a vendor for products and services and so difficult to move
to another vendor without switching costs, is also well known [12]. When the network is
dominated by the majorities, the majorities can be regarded as the de facto standard. Also,
the convergence of log return to +1 or -1 as lock-in.
The structured and growing models have several clusters, which leads to some different
aspects, comparing with the BA and WS models. In those models, clustering of agents
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with the minority opinion can induce and maintain their own market share. At least, the
minorities of those models can have a chance to be the majorities or expand their market
share even though the possibility is low, but not the BA and WS models. When the market is
dominated by one opinion, those who hold another opinion (or products or services) cannot
expand their market share. The distinguished feature of the structured and growing models
from others is the existence of high clusters. This can be applied to marketing strategies
in practice. For example, the success of the Apple iPod began from a few enthusiasts [42].
Of course, clustering cannot guarantee success, but it is not easy to reverse the majority
opinion without a high degree of clustering of customers, especially if there is already a de
facto standard or lock-in.
IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed opinion dynamics in complex networks. First we investigated a simple
tug-of-war game to identify the slow pace of fast change. The result of this game shows
that a great number of information sources leads to hesitation in decision-making and slow
change for the system. If a node in a given network has many neighbors, this node is sub-
ject to a great influx of information. The density of these nodes leads to clustering in the
network, with clusters maintaining their particular opinions against external information.
We examined this property using the microscopic spin model as the opinion model in the
Watts–Strogatz small-world and Baraba´si–Albert scale-free network models. In these com-
plex networks, information diffuses through the whole network very rapidly. Most nodes in
the network have the same opinions, which can be explained by a de facto standard, which
everyone seems to follow as an authorized standard in the market, and a lock-in effect,
whereby a customer depends on a vendor for products and services and finds it very difficult
to move to another vendor. However, the result for the structured and growing scale-free
network model with a high degree of clustering shows obvious differences. The clustering
may be regarded as groups of enthusiasts who make their own market share against the
majority opinion of the market, the de facto standard or the lock-in.
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